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Is Judgment Inscrutable?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2015

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Extract

Kant described the ability to move from theory to practice, to subsume particular facts under general principles, as “judgment”:

Between theory and practice, no matter how complete the theory may be, a middle term that provides a connection and transition is necessary. For to the concept of the understanding that contains the rule must be added an act of judgment by means of which the practitioner decides whether or not something is an instance of the rule.

But Kant had little to say by way of guidance for the exercise of judgment, because, in his view, judgment itself could not be completely theorized:

since further rules cannot always be added to guide judgment in its subsumptions (for that could go on indefinitely), there can be theoreticians who, lacking judgment, can never be practical in their lives, e.g., physicians or jurists, who, having done well in school, do not know how they should respond when they are asked for advice.

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Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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