Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Contending views of social justice often confront each other over claims about basic rights. In this paper I will begin with a familiar dispute of this kind, the crux of which proves to be the distribution of economic benefits and burdens. I will argue that it is is indeed illuminating to consider basic rights, and important in particular to examine an especially fundamental set of rights, namely, those that attach to the moral relationships that define the moral community. The blocking of these rights is a moral concern in itself and also often underlies more obvious social and economic inequalities. By considering this set of rights, we can uncover an unsuspected kind of justice which makes moral demands independently of a concern for distributive justice.
There is a longstanding and influential tradition of claiming that the duties of justice are solely “negative” duties. On this view the concerns of justice are concerns about “negative rights” of an especially basic kind, usually subsumed under the heading of “individual freedom.” Justice consists in our “not interfering with” these basic negative rights.