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Rawls on Method

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

C. F. Delaney*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame

Extract

It is my conviction that much of the criticism of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice misses its mark precisely because of a failure to appreciate the distinctive methodological structure of this work. I have three types of criticisms specifically in mind. First, the critic whose ultimate weapon is the counterexample. Secondly, the critic who focuses on one aspect of Rawls’ project without taking into account the whole theory. And thirdly, the critic who attempts to assess the theory absolutely rather than as one member of a set of welldefined alternatives. In this paper I hope to exhibit why these kinds of criticisms miss the mark, and I propose to do this indirectly by focusing on Rawls’ conception of philosophical method. Once this is exhibited, the relevance and irrelevance of certain kinds of criticisms becomes obvious. In my attempt to explicate Rawls’ conception of method, I will begin with his early methodological papers as providing the context within which the methodological structure of A Theory of justice should be viewed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1977

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