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Berkeley and Cartesianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Daisie Radner*
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Buffalo

Extract

A fair question to ask of any philosopher is: What problems is he trying to solve or to circumvent? The relevance of his work to his readers depends upon how live those problems are for them; the merit of his work depends upon his success in dealing with them. The problems which concerned Berkeley were problems inherited from Cartesianism—problems arising from the dualism of mental and material substance, the Cartesian conception of causality, and the representative theory of ideas. How can mind and matter interact if they are two substances totally different in nature and like can only act upon like? How can matter be a cause at all if it is inert and a cause is by nature active? How can ideas represent material substance and its modes if representation is a matter of resemblance and ideas, being modes of mind, are unlike anything material? All such problems are circumvented if one denies the reality of material substance, if one claims that there are only minds and their ideas and that ideas are neither caused by nor representative of independently existing material objects. This, of course, is Berkeley's position.

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