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Prichard vs. Plato: Intuition vs. Reflection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Extract

When H.A. Prichard launched his attack on the “mistake” in moral philosophy of “supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking,” he had Plato squarely in his sights. I Plato, in fact, is the poster boy for the strategy of trying to “supply by a process of reflection a proof of the truth of what … they have prior to reflection believed immediately or without proof.” As if this were not mistake enough, Prichard charges Plato with being the “most significant instance” of the error of trying to “justify morality by its profitableness,” because Plato's general acuity brings into sharp relief just how pernicious is the temptation to offer such justifications. Prichard has in view Plato's attempt in Republic to demonstrate that justice is oikeion agathon - one's own good - and Prichard complains that at best such an account can make us want to be just, rather than show us that we are obligated to be just, as direct apprehension purports to do.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2007

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