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Defending Backwards Causation1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Bryson Brown*
Affiliation:
University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB, Canada T1K 3M4

Extract

Whether we’re reading H.G. Wells, Robert Heinlein, Ray Bradbury, or Kurt Vonnegut, time travel is a wonderful narrative trick, freeing a story from the normal ‘one damn thing after another’ progression of time. But many philosophers claim it can never be more than that because backwards causation in general, and time travel in particular, are logically impossible.

In this paper I examine one type of argument commonly given for this disappointing conclusion: the time travel paradoxes. Happily for science fiction fans, these arguments fall far short of showing what they are intended to show. Why they fail can be better understood in the light of an analogy between these arguments and some arguments libertarians offer against determinism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1992

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