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Fictionalism and Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Neumann*
Affiliation:
Trent University

Extract

Suppose that a scientific theory X is well confirmed, and either states or (in conjunction with certain specified systems of logic, mathematics, and semantics) implies a statement like “classes exist”. Suppose, if the statement is not explicit but implied, that the specified systems are ‘accepted’ by two individuals, R and F, as the ‘best available'. Suppose, finally, that both R and F, in some yet to be explained sense of the word, ‘accept’ and use theory X to regulate their experience. Then we have something very like the situation discussed by Putnam and van Fraassen in their debate over ‘fictionalism'. I will argue that, in this situation, there is a great mystery over what would separate a fictionalist F from a realist R. Neither Putnam nor van Fraassen seems to be conscious of the problems involved.

Fictionalism, according to its opponent, Putnam, states

various entities presupposed by scientific and common sense discourse [are] merely “useful fictions”, or that we cannot, at any rate, possibly know that they are more than “useful fictions” (and so we may as well say that that is what they are) (PL 63).

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1978

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