Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T05:31:15.250Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Function of Epistemic Justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Frederick Adams*
Affiliation:
Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, MI, 48859, U.S.A.

Extract

There is a venerable and thoroughly entrenched tradition of regarding epistemic justification as playing an essential cognitive role in the acquisition, maintenance, or even loss of knowledge. Hold fixed that p is true and that S believes that p. Given this, whether S comes to know that p, still knows that p, or no longer knows that p essentially depends upon whether S has acquired, sustained, or lost justification for believing that p. I shall call any theory which regards epistemic justification as playing this essential epistemological function in cognition a Jn-theory. To simplify, we will say that a Jn-theorist is one who holds that - when the truth of p is held constant and S's belief that p is held constant - S's knowledge that p varies directly with the victory of S's justification and indirectly with its defeat.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable