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How Beliefs Find Their Objects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Beebe*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia

Extract

A theory is developed explaining how beliefs, and derivatively intentions and perhaps the other propositional attitudes, find their objects. Beliefs about particular objects are divided into two kinds. Attributive beliefs find their objects purely through the mediation of contained descriptive content, while referential beliefs connect directly with their objects via a causal connection. This distinction is explicated in terms of complementing semantic and epistemic differences, and details of the causal connection are explored.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1979

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