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How Can Intentions Make Actions Rational?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Joe Mintoff*
Affiliation:
School of Liberal Arts University of Newcastle Callagnan, NSW Australia 2308

Extract

Rational agents, it seems, are capable of adopting intentions which make actions rational and which they would otherwise have no reason to do, or even have reason not to do. Howard Sobel imagines the following, uncontroversial but somewhat contrived, example: ‘I'll give you a nickel if you now intend to hand me the red [pencil] in five minutes. I'll give you the nickel now. I don't care if you do hand me the red one when the five minutes are up. The nickel will be yours whether or not you do that then, if you manage now to intend to do it then’ (Sobel, 242-3, emphasis in original).

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2002

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