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In defence of fact-dependency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sem de Maagt*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
*

Abstract

G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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