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Integrity and Moral Danger

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Greg Scherkoske*
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS B3H 4P9, Canada

Extract

While it isn't clear that we are right to value integrity — or so I shall argue — most of us do. Persons of integrity merit respect. Compromising one's integrity — or failing completely to exhibit it — seems a serious flaw. Two influential accounts suggest why. For Bernard Williams, integrity is ‘a person's sticking by what [she] regards as ethically necessary or worthwhile.’ To this Cheshire Calhoun adds a helpful negative gloss:

To lack integrity is to underrate both formulating and exemplifying one's own views. People without integrity trade action on their own views too cheaply for gain, status, reward, approval or for escape from penalties, loss of status, disapproval. Or they trade their own views too readily for the views of others who are more authoritative, more in step with public opinion, less demanding of themselves, and so on.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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