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Interpreting Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Richard N. Manning*
Affiliation:
Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701Ohio University-Lancaster, Lancaster, OH 43130, USA

Extract

Donald Davidson infamously claims that belief is in its nature veridical, and that skepticism is for this reason fundamentally incoherent. To those who take the issue of external world skepticism seriously, Davidson's arguments may seem to involve a conjuring trick. In particular, his invocation of an ‘omniscient interpreter’, whose intelligibility supposedly ensures that our beliefs must be largely true, has the air of incense and lantern-rubbing about it. Davidson's claim has received considerable critical response in the literature, almost all of it negative. In my view, some commentators have indeed lit on a critical and controversial lemma in Davidson's argument, but this basic result has been obscured by being presented amidst an array of other criticisms that simply make no sense from a Davidsonian point of view. The aim of this paper is to clear away some of the confusion that stands in the way of a more productive evaluation of Davidson's important claim.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1995

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