Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T19:54:28.767Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Knowledge despite falsehood

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Martin Montminy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, 455 West Lindsey Street, Norman, OK 73019-2006, USA
*

Abstract

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S’s false belief that p is not essential to S’s cognition. S’s knowledge is instead due to S’s belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable