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Non-backtracking Counterfaduals and the Conditional Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mark Heller*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University DeKalb, IL 60115 U.S.A.

Extract

The conditional analysis of ability statements has many versions. In this paper I will deal with the version which claims that ‘xcan do y’is equivalent to ‘if xwere to choose to do y,then xwould do y.’However, my comments should be equally applicable to any analysis of ability statements that can properly be called a version of the conditional analysis. The intuition behind the conditional analysis is that what it is for one to be able to do something is for one's choice to be effective. To have an ability to do yis for it to be true that one's choosing to do ywould be effective - one's choosing to do ywould result inone's doing y. But this intuition is not captured by the conditional analysis in its standard form, and a restriction is needed to mend this defect. This restriction is based on a distinction among counterfactual conditionals.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1985

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