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On Identifying the Mental with the Physical

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Peter Smith*
Affiliation:
University College of Wales, Aberystwyth

Extract

Our states of belief and desire are no doubt supervenient on the overall pattern of our physical states. But can this minimal physicalist presumption be strengthened into a claim to the effect that our mental states are each identical with some specific corresponding physical state? A developed identity theory will need, in a sense to be made clear, a schema for specifying the physical state which is supposed to be identical with a given mental state. And there are problems in formulating such a schema. The special difficulties faced here by a type identity theory are well known, and will not be discussed further in this present paper. But equally, there are problems in constructing an identification schema for employment with a token identity theory.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1983

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