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Points of View and Practical Reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Robert Brandom*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh

Extract

Problems of practical reasoning often arise as the result of a clash between two different points of view. What do we mean when we say that while from the point of view of prudence there is no reason to rescue one's drowning enemy, from the point of view of morality there is reason to do so? In this essay we examine how the idiom of points of view arises in practical discourse, and offer a clarification of it. We will be particularly concerned with a common argument for assigning a privileged status to the moral point of view, an argument which can be seen to be fallacious once certain features of Judgments made from a point of view are clearly discerned.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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