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The Possibility of Special Duties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Philip Pettit
Affiliation:
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
Robert Goodin
Affiliation:
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex, Great Britain

Extract

In common-sense morality, certain special obligations loom large. These are duties which are laid upon agents, be they individuals or groups, in virtue of their distinctive identities, relationships or histories: because of who they are, how they are linked to others or what they have done in the past. The particularistic basis of these obligations means that no one but the agent in question is engaged by such a duty. It is that agent's alone.

These special obligations include duties towards oneself, towards one's dependants and towards those to whom one has made certain commitments. In each case they prescribe partisan treatment. The beneficiary is to enjoy a benefit which may not be especially important in the global scheme of things, and which may even be obtained at the cost of others’ being deprived of benefits that are equally or more important in some cosmic sense.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1986

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