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The Private Language Passages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

J.P. Schachter*
Affiliation:
Huron College

Extract

Discusssion of passages 243 et. seq. of Wittgenstein's Philosophical lnvestigations tends to concentrate on the argument supporting the thesis that a logically private language is impossible. When the discussion becomes broader, the presumption is generally that this thesis is one premifs of an argument against solipsism. I believe that the passages will support a valid argument that might, at first glance, give comfort to someone in the egocentric predicament, but that this comfort would quickly grow cold on closer examination. I do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein offers no escape from the predicament, only that the escape (if successful) will not be a consequence of the pluralism necessary to the existence of language, but rather a byproduct of his discussion of the logic of mental discourse. In this paper (sees. II through VI), I state an alternative to the contra-solipsist reading of the passages, taking Wittgenstein there to be reflecting a three part dispute, the other participants of which are a skeptic and a philosopher I'll call ‘the Realist'.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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