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Pro Buridano; Contra Hazenum

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ian Hinckfuss*
Affiliation:
University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia, 4067

Extract

Alan Hazen has claimed that Buridan’s theory of truth does not escape semantic paradox.

In this paper, I claim that Buridan's theory is untouched by Hazen's case.My solution to Hazen's paradox requires the recognition of the exceptionability of what I shall call T-Elimination, namely, the principle (to be clarified later) that from a statement that such and such is true, we may deduce such and such. The exceptions are explained by reference to the role of what I shall call the meta-content of a locution, that is, that information conveyed by any locution that tells us what sort of a locution it is intended to be. The exceptionability of T-Elimination turns out to be shared by other well-accepted principles of deduction alsoand for the same reasons.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1991

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