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Public Reason and Moral Compromise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Andrew Lister*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Studies, Queen's, University, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada

Extract

One source of controversy surrounding John Rawls's later work — a source of both criticism and praise — has been the impression that he abandoned the philosophical project of figuring out what is truly just, in favour of the political project of working out a feasible consensus for people from a particular political tradition. One aspect of this controversy is the question of whether Rawls could advance his theory as being worthy of endorsement on the basis of good reasons without also claiming it to be true. In preferring to claim reasonableness rather than truth, Rawls's main concern seems to have been to distinguish the ‘whole truth’ as represented by a particular comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine, from the truth about politics given that reasonable people will inevitably disagree about the whole truth.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2007

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