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Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Steven Nadler*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, U.S.A.

Extract

Part of Berkeley's strategy in his attack on materialism in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous is to argue that the epistemological distinction between ideas of so-called primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities, especially as this distinction is found in Locke, is untenable. Both kinds of ideas-those presenting to the mind the quantifiable properties of bodies (shape, size, extension, motion) and those which are just sensations (color, odor, taste, heat)-are equally perceptions in the mind, and there is no reason to believe that one kind (the ideas of primary qualities) represents true properties of independently existing external objects while the other kind does not.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1990

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