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Can and Might

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

K. W. Rankin*
Affiliation:
University of Victoria

Extract

Along with more customary claims, Richard Taylor advances a new argument against a straightforward indeterministic analysis of free will. The analysis at issue is straightforward in the sense that it considers an occurrence to be a freely performed action, for which someone is fully responsible, if and only if it is causally contingent (i.e. causally possible but not necessary) in a particular way. Since Taylor's assumptions lead him to regard this position as a non-starter, the new part of his argument is not expressly designed as anti-indeterministic. He assumes that if an action were merely causally contingent relative to its antecedent conditions, then it would be random in a sense which involves that no-one could be responsible for it. Unlike the determinists who assume this too, he believes, however, that causal contingency is a necessary, though not sufficient, feature of any freely performed action, for which someone is fully responsible. The new part of his argument is expressly designed to support this intermediate position by establishing the existence of some further factor in agency which in one of its roles supplements the contingency of any action that is freely performed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1971

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