Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T18:48:19.708Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Conditional Obligation and Detachment*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mark I. Vorobej*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4K1

Extract

Suppose that John has a moral obligation to stop smoking given that smoking is dangerous to his health. Suppose further that smoking is dangerous to his health. Does it follow that John has a moral obligation to stop smoking? Although intuition inclines one to answer in the affirmative, recent developments in deontic logic apparently call this inference into question. The issue at hand is whether unconditional obligations are detachable from conditional obligations on the basis of purely factual considerations. I believe that they are not. In the course of arguing for this position I defend a novel restricted rule of detachment which is constructed out of both factual and normative components.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable