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Culpability and Mental Disorder

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

R. Cummins*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Extract

It is widely held that the insane are not culpable for their offenses, or at least that they are not culpable for those offenses which are specific manifestations of mental disorder. Indeed, this is generally regarded by philosophers as a platitude. Yet it seems to me that what we have here is not a platitude, or even a truth, but an overly broad swipe with a dull blade. When we have brought the issues into sharper focus I think we will see that the mere fact that an offense was a manifestation of mental disorder never in itself exculpates, though it is sometimes relevant to determining whether the action was excusable in one of several standard ways. Moreover, I think it emerges that the issue is not nearly as significant as one might initially suppose it to be.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1980

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