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Excuses and ‘“Ought” Implies “Can”’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Lawrence L. Heintz*
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara

Extract

I will attempt to do two things in this paper.In Part I) I will show that H.A. Prichard failed to appreciate the limitations of the application of the ‘“ought” implies “can”’ principle. Where the ‘can’ is not the ‘can’ of physical impossibility the principle is false; the principle can be shown to be false when it is read this way by an examination of the role of excuses, which is not that of removing obligations. Part II) demonstrates how the misapplication of the ‘“ought” implies “can”’ principle is utilized in a chain of confusion: a confusion of excuses and justifications with respect to obligations and a confusion of the relation between obligations and blameworthiness.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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