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Fodor's Very Deep Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Martin Montminy*
Affiliation:
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada K1N 6N5

Extract

Pooh rubbed his nose with his paw, and said that the Heffalump might be walking along, humming a little song, and looking up at the sky, wondering if it would rain, and so he wouldn't see the Very Deep Pit until he was half-way down, when it would be too late. (A.A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh)

Jerry Fodor is loath to have content be constituted, even in part, by inferential relations. This loathing, I will argue, gets him into trouble. In his latest book, Concepts, Fodor contrasts informational atomism, his view of concepts and their content, with inferential role theory. The latter, he argues, is almost certainly false. This strikes cognitive science at its core, he adds, since the major theories of concepts currently in vogue in cognitive science are all variants on inferential role theory.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1999

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