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Foundations for Claiming Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Douglas Odegard*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1

Extract

One reasonably familiar argument for epistemological scepticism maintains that knowledge requires foundations and that we rarely, if ever, have such foundations. The conclusion of this argument is that we rarely, if ever, have knowledge. A second, less ambitious sceptical argument is that philosophers cannot justifiably say that they have knowledge unless their statement is based on foundations and that we never have such foundations. The conclusion of this argument is not that we never have knowledge, but that philosophers are never justified in saying that they have knowledge. The scepticism is Pyrrhonic, rather than Academic, and merely attempts to counter knowledge assertions, not establish that they are false. It tries to show that in most cases the best response we can give to ‘Do we have knowledge?’ is to remain indifferent.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1986

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