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Free will and probability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Danny Frederick*
Affiliation:
a Slate House, Hunstan Lane, Old Leake, Boston, PE22 9RG, UK

Abstract

The chance objection to incompatibilist accounts of free action maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent's control. Some attempts to circumvent this objection locate chance in events posterior to the action. Indeterministic-causation theories locate chance in events prior to the action. However, neither type of response gives an account of free action which avoids the chance objection. Chance must be located at the act of will if actions are to be both undetermined and under the agent's control. This dissolves the apparent paradox of Frankfurt-type cases as well as the chance objection to incompatibilist free will.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2013

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