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From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Daniel Y. Elstein
Affiliation:
University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK
Thomas Hurka
Affiliation:
University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5R 2M8, Canada

Extract

Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts — what are today called ‘thin’ moral concepts such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ and ‘wrong.’ This was the view, first, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either ‘ought’ or ‘good’; others thought there were two. But they all assumed that other moral concepts, including such ‘thick’ ones as the virtue-concepts ‘courageous’ and ‘kindly,’ can be reductively analyzed using one or more thin concepts and some more or less determinate descriptive content. This was also the view of many non-cognitivists who wrote later in the century, including C.L. Stevenson and R.M. Hare.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2009

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