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General Terms and Logical Subjects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Durrant*
Affiliation:
University of Wales, Cardiff

Extract

Can general terms stand as logical subjects? viz., following Professor Geach's exposition of subject and predicate, can general terms ever occur as an expression which is such that it can be said to stand for something that the sentence S (in which it occurs) is about, S itself being formed by attaching a predicate to that expression? Frege, in ‘On Concept and Object’, contended that no ‘concept’ could stand as the reference of a grammatical subject, in view of the essentially predicative nature of the ‘concept’, and, as for Frege a concept is what is expressed in language by a general term, no general term can stand as a logical subject.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1974

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