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A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Frederick R. Adams*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin

Extract

The analysis of function-ascribing statements, such as “the function of x is y”, is proving to be a difficult matter. It is difficult because we are only beginning to see the complexity which is involved in ascribing functions. The process of discovery has been slow and tedious, with each newly constructed analysis of the meaning of functional ascriptions yielding insights into the structure of functional analysis and functional explanation. However, as each analysis is, in turn, dismantled, we seem to see our insights slip away. In the wake of each exchange, a new member is added to the list of desiderata for an analysis of function-ascribing statements. Thus, the matter of finding a proper analysis of function attributions becomes more and more complex.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1979

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