Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T13:02:10.719Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Hare, Universalizability, and The Problem of Relevant Descriptions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kenneth Alan Milkman*
Affiliation:
Dawson College, Montreal

Extract

Many significant moral theories, ones to which a large number of philosophers pledge themselves, employ in a fundamental way the criterion of universalizability. This is true not only of Kant and his more illustrious successors, but also utilitarians of many sorts. But concomitant with adherence to universalizability as a moral criterion is adherence to the belief that certain features (properties) of putatively moral (right) acts and immoral (wrong) acts are relevant and others irrelevant to the determination to the rightness or wrongness of those acts. Despite the fact that this belief is problematic, few moral philosophers have openly struggled with the problem of relevant descriptions (or ‘relevance’ for short). It is as if investigation of this problem would invite unsettlable doubts about universalizability itself.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable