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The Involvement of Our Identity in Experiential Memory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ingmar Persson*
Affiliation:
Filosofiska lnstitutionen, Lunds Universitet, Kungshuset, S-222 22 Lund, Sweden

Extract

On many accounts, the criterion of our diachronic identity or persistence consists in or comprises some psychological conditions. As on Locke's account, these conditions often include one's appealing to the relation of remembering having an experience of. Contemporary theorists are unlikely to claim simply that a necessary condition for Pm at tm being the same person as Pn at a later time, tn, is that Pn remembers having experiences had by Pm at tm. They are more likely to appeal, as does Derek Parfit, to a ‘continuity of memory’ or ‘overlapping chains’ of memories, that is, to assert that Pn must at least remember having experiences had by somebody, Pn-1, existing at some time in-between tm and tn, that Pn-1 in turn must remember having experiences had by somebody Pn-2 … and so on back to Pm.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1997

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