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Kantian and Utilitarian Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1978

David A. Lloyd Thomas*
Affiliation:
Bedford College, University of London

Extract

It has been claimed that decisions reached democratically have the consent of those subject to them. It will be shown that arguments for this view rest on either a Kantian or a utilitarian conception of consent. When the distinct nature of these arguments is kept clearly in mind, it becomes apparent that little remains of any of them. Nothing remains of the argument based on the Kantian conception, at least in so far as it is used to support the view that democratic government rests on the consent of the governed. Though something remains of the arguments based on the utilitarian conception, what remains is not what they often are thought to establish. The spurious plausibility of consent arguments for democracy is due to switches between the Kantian conception of consent and the utilitarian.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1980

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