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Material Constitution and the Many-Many Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Robert A. Wilson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton AB T6G 2E7, Canada

Extract

Amongst the virtues extolled within analytic metaphysics are universality and parsimony. We value an account of what there is that includes everything, and we want a metaphysics that not only excludes what there isn't, but that also avoids the vice of double-counting. This vice leads to redundancies in one's ontology, such as asserting or entailing that there are, for example, minds over and above matter (if one is a materialist in the philosophy of mind), or groups of people over and above the individual people in those groups (if one is an individualist in the social sciences). An ontological view must be sufficiently pluralistic to achieve universality or completeness, yet sparse enough to respect parsimony or non-redundancy.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2008

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