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Mathematical Structuralism and the Third Man

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Hand*
Affiliation:
Texas A & M University, College Station, TX, 77843-4237, USA

Extract

Plato himself would be pleased at the recent emergence of a certain highly Platonic variety of platonism concerning mathematics, viz., the structuralism of Michael Resnik and Stewart Shapiro. In fact, this species of platonism is so Platonic that it is susceptible to an objection closely related to one raised against Plato by Parmenides in the dialogue of that name. This is the Third Man Argument (TMA) against a view about the relation of Forms to particulars. My objection is not a TMA against structuralism; the position avoids that objection, but is vulnerable to a different one precisely at the point where it avoids the TMA. The way structuralism avoids the TMA has in fact been considered, as one of Plato’s options, by at least one commentator on the Parmenides, Colin Strang, who explicitly rejects it on logical grounds. In the course of the discussion, I shall clarify the reason that I believe led Strang to reject this option, and shall modify his own statement of that reason.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1993

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