Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-w7t8q Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T11:43:46.289Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Susan Brower-Toland*
Affiliation:
Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO 63108, USA

Extract

Introduction

In this paper I examine William Ockham's theory of judgment — in particular, his account of the nature and ontological Status of its objects. ‘Judgment’ (Latin iudicio) is the expression Ockham and other medieval thinkers use to refer to a certain subset of what philosophers nowadays call ‘propositional attitudes’. Judgments include all and only those mental states in which a subject not only entertains a given propositional content, but also takes some positive stance with respect to its truth. For Ockham, therefore, as for other medievals, a judgment is a type of mental State that includes attitudes such as belief, knowledge, opinion, doubt, faith, and so on.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable