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On What Is Strictly Speaking True

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Charles Travis*
Affiliation:
Centrale Interfaculteit, Katholieke Hogeschool, Postbus 90153, 5000 L.E. Tilburg, The Netherlands

Extract

Let us begin with a piece of intellectual history. The story begins in a period encapsulating the second world war – say the ‘40’s, give and take a bit. Around then, it began to be argued with force that an expression – e.g., an English one – while it well might mean something, does not say anything, and notably (in typical cases at least) no one thing in particular. The principal behind the argument was surely J.L. Austin, though, I would claim, the same point was argued in a somewhat different way by Wittgenstein. The intended point was not merely a grammatical one: we say of an expression that it means such and such, but not that it says such and such. Be that as it may, the main point was quite substantive: typically, an (e.g.) English expression is such that, with its meaning (unambiguously) fixed, there are a variety of distinct (perhaps better: distinguishable) things to be said in using it on some production of it or other.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1985

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