Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T04:53:17.483Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Ordinary Ability and Free Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Paul Benson*
Affiliation:
The University of Dayton, Dayton, OH 45469, U.S.A.

Extract

We can understand much, perhaps most, of our thinking and speaking about persons’ powers, capabilities, capacities, skills, and competences to act as employing a particular concept of ability. This concept is so pervasive in discourse about these matters that it is appropriately called the ordinary notion of ability. However, the pervasiveness of this concept does not mean that we clearly comprehend its content or readily distinguish it from the many other senses of ability with which we can be concerned.

The ordinary notion of ability is properly distinguished by two features. First, one's performing an action intentionally at a certain time is sufficient for one's having the ordinary ability at that time to perform that action. The ordinary ability to do something is an ability to do it intentionally.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable