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Paternalism and Subsequent Consent

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Donald Van De Veer*
Affiliation:
North Carolina State University at Raleigh

Extract

Some philosophers believe that appeals to promoting or maximizing good consequences are a suspect way of attempting to justify coercive interference with another person's actions. Suppose that is true. If there is a presumption that individuals have a right not to be coercively interfered with, then, foregoing utilitarian type appeals, it would seem that the only way to justify coercive interference of a paternalistic sort would be to show that under certain conditions the presumption fails.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1979

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