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Respect for Persons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sarah Buss*
Affiliation:
269 English Philosophy Bldg, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1408, USA

Extract

We believe we owe one another respect. We believe we ought to pay what we owe by treating one another ‘with respect.’ If we could understand these beliefs we would be well on the way to understanding morality itself. If we could justify these beliefs we could vindicate a central part of our moral experience.

Respect comes in many varieties. We respect some people for their upright character, others for their exceptional achievements. There are people we respect as forces of nature: we go to great lengths to accommodate their moods, wiles, and demands. Finally, most of us seem to respect people simply because they are people. This is the sort of respect of special interest to moral theory.

In order to be worthy of this last sort of respect, it is not only sufficient but necessary that one be a person. We can, of course, take a similar attitude toward nonpersons.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1999

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