Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T10:37:12.622Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Russell's “Proof”, Again

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

James D. Carney*
Affiliation:
Arizona State University

Extract

Often Bertrand Russell defends his view that names differ from descriptions in that names have meaning but descriptions do not by using a “proof.” Recently in this journal it has been debated whether Russell's “proof” fails or not. The familiar objection to Russell's argument is that it is circular or it involves a sense/reference equivocation. Avrum Stroll suggests a novel criticism by making use of a “mirror argument“ which attempts to show that Russell's argument can be used to conclude that "Scott" has no meaning, and that thus the argument proves too much or nothing. Robert Fahrnkopf defends Russell's argument, but, I believe, he does not go far enough in his defense. So it will be useful to carry this debate a few steps further.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1980

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable