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Russell's “Proof”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Avrum Stroll*
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego

Extract

In this paper, I wish to revisit some familiar terrain, namely an argument that occurs in many of Russell's writings on the theory of descriptions and which he repeatedly describes as a “proof.” For the past two decades this argument has been the subject of considerable philosophical controversy. The prevailing view has been that it is invalid. Leonard Linsky, for instance, maintains that it is (viciously) circular, while Peter Geach, W.V.O. Quine, and Alan White have argued that it equivocates on two different senses of the word “means” and is therefore fallacious. Yet the argument has also had its defenders. In an acute and persuasive paper, R.K. Perkins has recently contended that some of these critics fail to understand that Russell is employing the term “means” in a special and technical sense, where it is equivalent to “naming”, and that when so understood, the argument does in fact go through.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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