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Subset Realization and Physical Identification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kevin Morris*
Affiliation:
Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ 86011, USA

Extract

According to a prominent line of thought, we can be physicalists, but not reductive physicalists, by holding that mental and other ‘higher-level’ or ‘nonbasic’ properties — properties that are not obviously physical properties — are all physically realized. Spelling this out requires an account of realization, an account of what it is for one property to realize another. And while several accounts of realization have been advanced in recent years, my interest here is in the ‘subset view,’ which has often been invoked explicitly in defense of nonreductive physicalist positions.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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