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What are Propositions?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mark Richard*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138

Abstract

This paper defends the view that propositions – that is, what are picked about by complement clauses and the range of quantifiers like that in ‘Sanna believes all that Matti said’ – are states of affairs. States of affairs – and thus propositions – are not, in the primary sense, representational; what is representational and what is true or false in the first instance are mental states and sentence tokens that represent propositions. There is, it is argued, a derivative sense in which propositions are bearers of truth, but truth in that sense is a derivative, non-explanatory notion. This view is contrasted with views like the one Scott Soames develops in What is Meaning?. It’s argued that this view is superior to Soames’ in various ways.

Information

Type
Theoretical Alternatives to Propositions
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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