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What is Frege's Relativity Argument?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Palle Yourgrau*
Affiliation:
Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254-9110, USA

Extract

Sets are multitudes which are also unities. It is surprising that the fact that multitudes are also unities leads to no contradictions: this is the main fact of mathematics.

Kurt Gödel (Hao Wang, A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy)

In what sense can something be at the same time one and many? The problem is familiar since Plato (for example, Republic 524e). In recent times, Whitehead and Russell, in Principia Mathematica, have been struck by the difficulty of the problem: ‘If there is such an object as a class, it must be in some sense one object, yet it is only of classes that many can be predicated. Hence, if we admit classes as objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and many, which seems impossible.' It is, however, in Frege's great work, The Foundations of Arithmetic (henceforth, Grundlagen), that many see the final resolution of the old question: how can something be at the same time one and many?

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1997

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