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Why cognitivism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Yair Levy*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
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Abstract

Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.

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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017