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Why it isn't syntax that unifies the proposition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Logan Fletcher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, United States
*

Abstract

King develops a syntax-based account of propositions based on the idea that propositional unity is grounded in the syntactic structure of the sentence. This account faces two objections: a Benacerraf objection and a grain-size objection. I argue that the syntax-based account survives both objections, as they have been put forward in the existing literature. I go on to show, however, that King equivocates between two distinct notions of ‘propositional structure’ when explaining his account. Once the confusion is resolved, it is clear that the syntax-based account suffers from both Benacerraf and grain-size problems after all. I conclude by showing that King's account can be revised to avoid these problems, but only if it abandons its motivating idea that it is syntax that unifies the proposition.

Information

Type
On Act- and Language-Based Conceptions of Propositions
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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