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Why Potentiality Matters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jim Stone*
Affiliation:
University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148, U.S.A.

Extract

Do fetuses have a right to life in virtue of the fact that they are potential adult human beings? I take the claim that the fetus is a potential adult human being to come to this: if the fetus grows normally there will be an adult human animal that was once the fetus. Does this fact ground a claim to our care and protection? A great deal hangs on the answer to this question. The actual mental and physical capacities of a human fetus are inferior to those of adult creatures generally thought to lack a serious right to life (e.g., adult chickens), and the mere fact that a fetus belongs to our species in particular seems morally irrelevant. Consequently, a strong fetal claim to protection rises or falls with the appeal to the fetus's potentiality, for nothing else can justify it.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1987

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